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Abstract
We consider a simple model of the choice of strategic variables under relative
profit maximization by firms in an asymmetric oligopoly with differentiated sub-
stitutable goods such that there are three firms, Firm 1, 2 and 3, demand functions
are linear and symmetric, marginal costs are constant, there is no fixed cost, Firm 2
and 3 have the same cost function, but Firm 1 has a different cost function. In such
a model we show that there are two pure strategy sub-game perfect equilibria. One
is such that all firms choose the outputs as their strategic variables, and the other is
such that Firm 2 and 3 choose the outputs as their strategic variables, and Firm 1
chooses the price as its strategic variable.
Keywords. relative profit maximization; asymmetric oligopoly; choice of strategic
variables
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1 Introduction
In a symmetric duopoly with differentiated goods Tanaka (2013) has shown the fol-
lowing results.
If firms maximize their relative profits, the choice of strategic variables,
price or output, is irrelevant to the outcome of the game in the sense that
the equilibrium outputs, prices and profits of the firms are the same in all
situations. Thus, any combination of strategy choice by the firms consti-
tutes a sub-game perfect equilibrium in a two stage game such that in the
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first stage the firms choose their strategic variables and in the second stage
they determine the values of their strategic variables.
Symmetry means that demand functions are symmetric and firms have the same cost
function. This conclusion can be extended to a symmetric oligopoly and an asymmetric
duopoly. But it can not be extended to an asymmetric oligopoly. Asymmetry means
that demand functions may be asymmetric or firms may have different cost functions.
In recent years, maximizing relative profit instead of absolute profit has aroused
the interest of economists. Please see Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Lu (2011),
Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato (2013), Miller and Pazgal (2001), Vega-Redondo
(1997) and Schaffer (1989).
In Vega-Redondo (1997), it is argued that, in a homogeneous good case, if firms
maximize their relative profits, a competitive equilibrium can be induced. But in the
case of differentiated goods, the result under relative profit maximization is different
from the competitive result.
We think that seeking for relative profit or utility is based on the nature of human.
Even if a person earns a big money, if his brother/sister or close friend earns a bigger
money than him, he is not sufficiently happy and may be disappointed. On the other
hand, even if he is very poor, if his neighbor is more poor, he may be consoled by that
fact.
In this paper we consider a simple model of the choice of strategic variables under
relative profit maximization by firms in an asymmetric oligopoly with differentiated
substitutable goods such that there are three firms, Firm 1, 2 and 3, demand functions
are linear and symmetric, marginal costs of the firms are constant, there is no fixed
cost, Firm 2 and 3 have the same cost function, but Firm 1 has a different cost function.
In such a model we show the following result.
There are two pure strategy sub-game perfect equilibria. One is such that
all firms choose the outputs as their strategic variables, and the other is
such that Firm 2 and 3 choose the outputs as their strategic variables, and
Firm 1 chooses the price as its strategic variable.
In the next section we present a model of this paper. In Section 3 we analyze equi-
libria in the second stage of the game. In this stage (the managers of) firms determine
the values of their strategic variables so as to maximize their relative profits. In Section
4 we investigate equilibria in the first stage of the game. In this stage the owners of
firms choose the strategic variables so as to maximize the relative profits of the firms.
In Section 5 we briefly mention the results when the owners of firms seek to maximize
the absolute profits of the firms. Miller and Pazgal (2001) presented a similar study.
They showed the equivalence of price strategy and quantity strategy in a delegation
game of a duopoly when owners of firms control managers of firms seek to maximize
an appropriate combination of absolute and relative profits. In their model the owner
of each firm determines the weight on the rival firm’s profit in the objective function of
its firm. We do not consider, however, such a delegation game. In our analysis owners
of firms choose the strategic variables.
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2 The model
There are three firms. Firm 1, 2 and 3. They produce differentiated substitutable goods.
The outputs and prices of the goods of the firms are denoted by x1, x2, x3, p1, p2 and
p3. The inverse demand functions are
p1 = a  x1 bx2 bx3; (1)
p2 = a  x2 bx1 bx3; (2)
p3 = a  x3 bx1 bx2: (3)
We assume a> 0 and 0< b< 1.
From (2) and (3), from (1) and (3) and from (1) and (2) we have
p2+ p3 = 2a  (1+b)(x2+ x3) 2bx1;
p1+ p3 = 2a  (1+b)(x1+ x3) 2bx2;
p1+ p2 = 2a  (1+b)(x1+ x2) 2bx3:
Substituting them into (1), (2) and (3), we obtain the following ordinary demand func-
tions.
x1 =
1
(1 b)(1+2b) [(1 b)a  (1+b)p1+bp2+bp3]; (4)
x2 =
1
(1 b)(1+2b) [(1 b)a  (1+b)p2+bp1+bp3]; (5)
x3 =
1
(1 b)(1+2b) [(1 b)a  (1+b)p3+bp1+bp2]: (6)
The inverse and ordinary demand functions are symmetric.
The constant marginal costs of Firm 1, 2 and 3 are c1, c2 and c3. There is no fixed
cost. In Section 4 we assume c2 = c3 and c1 6= c2.
The relative profit of a firm is defined as the difference between its (absolute) profit
and the average of the (absolute) profits of the rival firms.
We consider a two stage game. In the first stage (owners of) the firms choose their
strategic variables, price or quantity (output), and in the second stage (managers of) the
firms determine the values of their strategic variables. In Section 4 we consider a case
where owners of firms choose the strategic variables to maximize the relative profits,
and in Section 5 we briefly mention a case where owners of firms choose the strategic
variables to maximize the absolute profits.
3 The second stage of the game
3.1 One firm is a price setting firm
In this subsection we assume that one of the firms is a price setting firm, that is, it
chooses the price as its strategic variable, and other two firms are quantity setting firms,
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that is, they choose the outputs as their strategic variables. The price setting firm is Firm
2, and the quantity setting firms are Firm 1 and 3. The output and the price of the good
of Firm 1 are denoted by x1 and p1, and so on. The ordinary demand function for Firm
2 is
x2 = a  p2 bx1 bx3: (7)
From this and (1), (2) and (3), the inverse demand functions for Firm 1 and 3 are
derived as follows.
p1 = (1 b)a+bp2  (1 b2)x1 b(1 b)x3; (8)
and
p3 = (1 b)a+bp2  (1 b2)x3 b(1 b)x1: (9)
Denote the relative profits of Firm 1, 2 and 3 by Π1, Π2 and Π3. Then,
Π1 =[(1 b)a+bp2  (1 b2)x1 b(1 b)x3]x1  c1x1  12 f(a  p2 bx1 bx3)(p2  c2)
+[(1 b)a+bp2  (1 b2)x3 b(1 b)x1]x3  c3x3
	
;
Π2 =(a  p2 bx1 bx3)(p2  c2)  12

[(1 b)a+bp2  (1 b2)x1 b(1 b)x3]x1
 c1x1+[(1 b)a+bp2  (1 b2)x3 b(1 b)x1]x3  c3x3
	
;
and
Π3 =[(1 b)a+bp2  (1 b2)x3 b(1 b)x1]x3  c3x3  12 f(a  p2 bx1 bx3)(p2  c2)
+[(1 b)a+bp2  (1 b2)x1 b(1 b)x3]x1  c1x1
	
:
The conditions of relative profit maximization for Firm 1, 2 and 3 are
(1 b)a+bp2 2(1 b2)x1 b(1 b)x3  c1  12 [ bp2 b(1 b)x3+bc2] = 0;
a 2p2 bx1 bx3+ c2  12 (bx1+bx3) = 0;
and
(1 b)a+bp2 2(1 b2)x3 b(1 b)x1  c3  12 [ bp2 b(1 b)x1+bc2] = 0:
Arranging the terms,
 3bp2+4(1 b2)x1+b(1 b)x3 = 2(1 b)a 2c1 bc2; (10)
4p2+3bx1+3bx3 = 2a+2c2; (11)
 3bp2+b(1 b)x1+4(1 b2)x3 = 2(1 b)a 2c3 bc2 (12)
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are derived. From (10), (11), (12) we get the equilibrium price of Firm 2 and the
equilibrium outputs of Firm 1 and 3 as follows.
p1p2 =
(1 b)(4 b)a+(4+b 2b2)c2+3bc1+3bc3
(2+b)(4 b) ;
x1q1 =
(1 b)(4 b)(4+3b)a+b(1 b)(4+3b)c2  (16 7b2)c1+b(4+5b)c3
(1 b)(2+b)(4 b)(4+3b) ;
and
x1q3 =
(1 b)(4 b)(4+3b)a+b(1 b)(4+3b)c2+b(4+5b)c1  (16 7b2)c3
(1 b)(2+b)(4 b)(4+3b) :
A superscript p indicates price setting firm, a superscript q indicates quantity setting
firm, and 1 indicates the case of this subsection. Assuming that c2 = c3 and c1 6= c2,
the relative profits of Firm 1, 2 and 3 are written as
Π1q1 =
c2  c1
(1 b)(2+b)(4 b)2(4+3b)2 [(256 288b
2 16b3+57b4 9b5)a
  (128+64b 104b2 28b3+21b4)c1  (128 64b 184b2+12b3+36b4 9b5)c2];
Π1p2 = 
c2  c1
2(1 b)(2+b)(4 b)2(4+3b)2 [(256 288b
2 16b3+57b4 9b5)a
  (128+64b 104b2+8b3+39b4)c1  (128 64b 184b2 24b3+18b4 9b5)c2];
Π1q3 = 
c2  c1
2(1 b)(2+b)(4 b)2(4+3b)2 [(256 288b
2 16b3+57b4 9b5)a
  (128+64b 104b2 64b3+3b4)c1  (128 64b 184b2+48b3+54b4 9b5)c2]:
If Firm 3 is a price setting firm, the relative profits of the firms are written as fol-
lows.
Π1q1 =
c2  c1
(1 b)(2+b)(4 b)2(4+3b)2 [(256 288b
2 16b3+57b4 9b5)a
  (128+64b 104b2 28b3+21b4)c1  (128 64b 184b2+12b3+36b4 9b5)c2];
Π1q2 = 
c2  c1
2(1 b)(2+b)(4 b)2(4+3b)2 [(256 288b
2 16b3+57b4 9b5)a
  (128+64b 104b2 64b3+3b4)c1  (128 64b 184b2+48b3+54b4 9b5)c2];
Π1p3 = 
c2  c1
2(1 b)(2+b)(4 b)2(4+3b)2 [(256 288b
2 16b3+57b4 9b5)a
  (128+64b 104b2+8b3+39b4)c1  (128 64b 184b2 24b3+18b4 9b5)c2]:
If Firm 1 is a price setting firm, the relative profits of the firms are written as fol-
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lows.
Π1p1 =
(c2  c1)[(16 8b+b2)a  (8+b2)c1 8(1 b)c2]
(2+b)(4 b)2 ;
Π1q2 = 
(c2  c1)[(16 8b+b2)a  (8+b2)c1 8(1 b)c2]
2(2+b)(4 b)2 ;
Π1q3 = 
(c2  c1)[(16 8b+b2)a  (8+b2)c1 8(1 b)c2]
2(2+b)(4 b)2 :
3.2 Two firms are price setting firms
In this subsection we assume that one of the firms is a quantity setting firm, and other
two firms are price setting firms. The quantity setting firm is Firm 3 and the price
setting firms are Firm 1 and 2. The inverse demand function for Firm 3 is
p3 =
1
1+b
[(1 b)a  (1 b)(1+2b)x3+bp2+bp1] (13)
From this and (4), (5) and (6), the ordinary demand functions for Firm 1 and 2 are
derived as follows.
x1 =
1
(1 b)(1+2b)f(1 b)a  (1+b)p1
+
b
1+b
[(1 b)a  (1 b)(1+2b)x3+bp2+bp1]+bp2g (14)
=
1
1 b2 f(1 b)a  p1+bp2 b(1 b)x3g ;
and
x2 =
1
(1 b)(1+2b)f(1 b)a  (1+b)p2
+
b
1+b
[(1 b)a  (1 b)(1+2b)x3+bp2+bp1]+bp1g (15)
=
1
1 b2 f(1 b)a  p2+bp1 b(1 b)x3g :
The relative profits of Firm 1, 2 and 3 are written as follows.
Π1 =
1
1 b2 [(1 b)a  p1+bp2 b(1 b)x3] (p1  c1)
  1
2

1
1+b
[(1 b)a  (1 b)(1+2b)x3+bp2+bp1]x3  c3x3
+
1
1 b2 [(1 b)a  p2+bp1 b(1 b)x3] (p2  c2)

;
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Π2 =
1
1 b2 [(1 b)a  p2+bp1 b(1 b)x3] (p2  c2)
  1
2

1
1+b
[(1 b)a  (1 b)(1+2b)x3+bp2+bp1]x3  c3x3
+
1
1 b2 [(1 b)a  p1+bp2 b(1 b)x3] (p1  c1)

;
and
Π3 =
1
1+b
[(1 b)a  (1 b)(1+2b)x3+bp2+bp1]x3  c3x3
  1
2

1
1 b2 [(1 b)a  p2+bp1 b(1 b)x3] (p2  c2)
+
1
1 b2 [(1 b)a  p1+bp2 b(1 b)x3] (p1  c1)

:
The conditions of relative profit maximization for Firm 1, 2 and 3 are
1
1 b2 [(1 b)a 2p1+bp2 b(1 b)x3+ c1] 
1
2

b
1+b
x3+
b
1 b2 (p2  c2)

= 0;
1
1 b2 [(1 b)a 2p2+bp1 b(1 b)x3+ c2] 
1
2

b
1+b
x3+
b
1 b2 (p1  c1)

= 0;
and
1
1+b
[(1 b)a 2(1 b)(1+2b)x3+bp2+bp1]  c3
  1
2(1 b2) [ b(1 b)(p2  c2) b(1 b)(p1  c1)] = 0:
Arranging the terms,
2(1 b)a+bp2 4p1 3b(1 b)x3+bc2+2c1 = 0; (16)
2(1 b)a 4p2+bp1 3b(1 b)x3+2c2+bc1 = 0; (17)
2(1 b)2a 4(1 b)2(1+2b)x3+3b(1 b)p2+3b(1 b)p1 (18)
 2(1 b)(1+b)c3 b(1 b)c2 b(1 b)c1 = 0
are derived. From (16), (17), (18) we get the equilibrium output of Firm 3 and the
equilibrium prices of Firm 1 and 2 as follows.
x2q3 =
(1 b)(4+5b)a  (1+b)(4 b)c3+b(1+2b)c2+b(1+2b)c1
(1 b)(2+b)(4+5b) ;
p2p1 =
1
(2+b)(4+b)(4+5b)
[(1 b)(4+b)(4+5b)a+3b(1+b)(4+b)c3
+3b(4+7b+2b2)c2+(1+b)(16+16b+b
2)c1]+ c1;
7
and
p2p2 =
1
(2+b)(4+b)(4+5b)
[(1 b)(4+b)(4+5b)a+3b(1+b)(4+b)c3
+(1+b)(16+16b+b2)c2+3b(4+7b+2b
2)c1]+ c2:
A superscript 2 indicates the case of this subsection. Assuming that c2 = c3 and c1 6= c2,
the relative profits of Firm 1, 2 and 3 are written as
Π2p1 =
c2  c1
(1 b)(2+b)(4+b)2(4+5b)2 [(256+512b 21b
2 496b3 215b4 25b5)a
  (128+320b+152b2 124b3 91b4 16b5)c1
  (128+192b 184b2 372b3 124b4 9b5)c2];
Π2p2 = 
c2  c1
2(1 b)(2+b)(4+b)2(4+5b)2 [(256+512b 21b
2 496b3 215b4 25b5)a
  (128+320b+152b2 88b3 37b4+2b5)c1
  (128+192b 184b2 408b3 178b4 27b5)c2];
Π2q3 = 
c2  c1
2(1 b)(2+b)(4+b)2(4+5b)2 [(256+512b 21b
2 496b3 215b4 25b5)a
  (128+320b+152b2 160b3 145b4 34b5)c1
  (128+192b 184b2 336b3 70b4 9b5)c2]:
If Firm 2 is a quantity setting firm, the relative profits of the firms are written as
follows.
Π2p1 =
c2  c1
(1 b)(2+b)(4+b)2(4+5b)2 [(256+512b 21b
2 496b3 215b4 25b5)a
  (128+320b+152b2 124b3 91b4 16b5)c1
  (128+192b 184b2 372b3 124b4 9b5)c2];
Π2q2 = 
c2  c1
2(1 b)(2+b)(4+b)2(4+5b)2 [(256+512b 21b
2 496b3 215b4 25b5)a
  (128+320b+152b2 160b3 145b4 34b5)c1
  (128+192b 184b2 336b3 70b4 9b5)c2];
Π2p3 = 
c2  c1
2(1 b)(2+b)(4+b)2(4+5b)2 [(256+512b 21b
2 496b3 215b4 25b5)a
  (128+320b+152b2 88b3 37b4+2b5)c1
  (128+192b 184b2 408b3 178b4 27b5)c2]:
If Firm 1 is a quantity setting firm, the relative profits of the firms are written as
8
follows.
Π2q1 =
c2  c1
2(1 b)(2+b)(4+b)2(4+5b)2 [(16+24b 15b
2 25b3)a
  (8+16b+b2 7b3)c1 2(4+4b 8b2 9b3)c2];
Π2p2 = 
c2  c1
2(1 b)(2+b)(4+b)2(4+5b)2 [(16+24b 15b
2 25b3)a
  (8+16b+b2 7b3)c1 2(4+4b 8b2 9b3)c2];
Π2p3 = 
c2  c1
2(1 b)(2+b)(4+b)2(4+5b)2 [(16+24b 15b
2 25b3)a
  (8+16b+b2 7b3)c1 2(4+4b 8b2 9b3)c2]:
3.3 Cournot and Bertrand equilibria
Consider the Cournot equilibrium in which all firms are quantity setting firms and the
Bertrand equilibrium in which all firms are price setting firms. The equilibrium outputs
at the Cournot equilibrium are obtained as follows.
xC1 =
(4 b)a  (4+b)c1+bc2+bc3
(2+b)(4 b) ;
xC2 =
(4 b)a  (4+b)c2+bc1+bc3
(2+b)(4 b) ;
and
xC3 =
(4 b)a  (4+b)c3+bc1+bc2
(2+b)(4 b) :
C indicates Cournot. Assuming c3 = c2 and c1 6= c2, the relative profits of Firm 1, 2
and 3 at the Cournot equilibrium are written as
ΠC1 =
(c2  c1)[(4 b)2a  (8+b2)c1 8(1 b)c2]
(2+b)(4 b)2 ;
ΠC2 = 
(c2  c1)[(4 b)2a  (8+b2)c1 8(1 b)c2]
2(2+b)(4 b)2 ;
ΠC3 = 
(c2  c1)[(4 b)2a  (8+b2)c1 8(1 b)c2]
2(2+b)(4 b)2 :
The equilibrium prices at the Bertrand equilibrium are
pB1 =
(1 b)(4+5b)a+(4+7b+4b2)c1+3b(1+b)c2+3b(1+b)c3
(2+b)(4+5b)
;
pB2 =
(1 b)(4+5b)a+(4+7b+4b2)c2+3b(1+b)c1+3b(1+b)c3
(2+b)(4+5b)
;
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and
pB3 =
(1 b)(4+5b)a+(4+7b+4b2)c3+3b(1+b)c1+3b(1+b)c2
(2+b)(4+5b)
:
B indicates Bertrand. Assuming that c2 = c3 and c1 6= c2, the relative profits of Firm 1,
2 and 3 at the Bertrand equilibrium are
ΠB1 =
(c2  c1)[(16+24b 15b2 25b3)a  (8+16b+b2 7b3)c1 2(4+4b 8b2 9b3)c2]
(1 b)(2+b)(4+5b)2 ;
ΠB2 = 
(c2  c1)[(16+24b 15b2 25b3)a  (8+16b+b2 7b3)c1 2(4+4b 8b2 9b3)c2]
2(1 b)(2+b)(4+5b)2 ;
ΠB3 = 
(c2  c1)[(16+24b 15b2 25b3)a  (8+16b+b2 7b3)c1 2(4+4b 8b2 9b3)c2]
2(1 b)(2+b)(4+5b)2 :
4 The first stage of the game
The owner of each firm maximizes the relative profit of its firm.
4.1 The best responses of Firm 1
1. Assume that Firm 2 and 3 are quantity setting firms. Compare the relative profit
of Firm 1 when it chooses the price as a strategic variable and that when it
chooses the output as a strategic variable. Then, we have
Π1p1  ΠC1 = 
9b3(4+b)(c2  c3)2
2(1 b)(4 b)2(4+3b)2 = 0: (19)
Thus, price and output are indifferent, and both are best responses.
2. Assume that Firm 2 and 3 are price setting firms. Compare the relative profit of
Firm 1 when it chooses the price as a strategic variable and that when it chooses
the output as a strategic variable. Then, we have
ΠB1  Π2q1 = 
9b3(4+3b)(c2  c3)2
2(1 b)(4+b)2(4+5b)2 = 0: (20)
Thus, price and output are indifferent, and both are best responses.
3. Assume that one of Firm 2 and 3 is a quantity setting firm and the other is a price
setting firm. Compare the relative profit of Firm 1 when it chooses the price as
a strategic variable and that when it chooses the output as a strategic variable.
Then, we have
Π2p1  Π1q1 = 
144b7(2+b)(c1  c2)2
(1 b)(4 b)2(4+b)2(4+3b)2(4+5b)2 < 0: (21)
Thus, the output is the best response of Firm 1.
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4.2 The best responses of Firm 2 (or 3)
The situation of Firm 2 and that of Firm 3 are symmetric.
1. Assume that Firm 1 and 3 are quantity setting firms. Compare the relative profit
of Firm 2 when it chooses the price as a strategic variable and that when it
chooses the output as a strategic variable. Then, since c1 6= c2 and c2 = c3 we
have
Π1p2  ΠC2 = 
9b3(4+b)(c1  c2)2
2(1 b)(4 b)2(4+3b)2 < 0: (22)
Thus, the output is the best response of Firm 2.
2. Assume that Firm 1 and 3 are price setting firms. Compare the relative profit of
Firm 2 when it chooses the price as a strategic variable and that when it chooses
the output as a strategic variable. Then, we have
ΠB2  Π2q2 = 
9b3(4+3b)(c1  c2)2
2(1 b)(4+b)2(4+5b)2 < 0: (23)
Thus, the output is the best response of Firm 2.
3. Assume that Firm 1 is a price setting firm and Firm 3 is a quantity setting firm.
Compare the relative profit of Firm 2 when it chooses the price as a strategic
variable and that when it chooses the output as a strategic variable. Then, we
have
Π2p2  Π1q2 = 
9b3(3b3+12b2+80b+64)(c1  c2)2
2(1 b)(4 b)2(4+b)2(4+5b)2 < 0: (24)
Thus, the output is the best response of Firm 2.
4. Assume that Firm 3 is a price setting firm and Firm 1 is a quantity setting firm.
Compare the relative profit of Firm 2 when it chooses the price as a strategic
variable and that when it chooses the output as a strategic variable. Then, we
have
Π2p2  Π1q2 =
9b3(7b3 44b2 112b 64)(c1  c2)2
2(1 b)(4 b)2(4+3b)2(4+5b)2 < 0: (25)
Thus, the output is the best response of Firm 2.
4.3 Sub-game perfect equilibria
From these results we obtain the following conclusion.
Proposition 1 There are two pure strategy sub-game perfect equilibria as follows.
1. All firms choose the outputs as their strategic variables.
2. Firm 2 and 3 choose the outputs as their strategic variables, and Firm 1 chooses
the price as its strategic variable.
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4.4 A note on a symmetric case
If the oligopoly is symmetric, that is, c1 = c2 = c3, all of (21), (22), (23), (24) and (25)
are zero. Then, output and price are indifferent for all firms in all situations, and so any
combination of strategies of the firms constitutes a sub-game perfect equilibrium.
5 Absolute profit maximizing owners
It may be natural that the owners of firms seek to maximize the absolute profits of
their firms. In this section we briefly mention the results of that case. The equilibrium
outputs and prices are the same as those in the previous section. We consider the first
stage of the game.
Denote the absolute profit of Firm 1 when it is a price setting firm and other firms
are quantity setting firms by pi1p1 , and so on.
5.1 The best responses of (the owner of) Firm 1
1. Assume that Firm 2 and 3 are quantity setting firms. Compare the absolute
profit of Firm 1 when it chooses the price as a strategic variable and that when it
chooses the output as a strategic variable. Then, we have
pi1p1  piC1 = 0: (26)
Thus, price and output are indifferent, and both are best responses.
2. Assume that Firm 2 and 3 are price setting firms. Compare the absolute profit of
Firm 1 when it chooses the price as a strategic variable and that when it chooses
the output as a strategic variable. Then, we have
piB1  pi2q1 = 0: (27)
Thus, price and output are indifferent, and both are best responses.
3. Assume that one of Firm 2 and 3 is a quantity setting firm and the other is a price
setting firm. Compare the absolute profit of Firm 1 when it chooses the price as
a strategic variable and that when it chooses the output as a strategic variable.
Then, we have
pi2p1  pi1q1 = 
48b5(3b3 10b2 48b 32)(c1  c2)2
(1 b)(4 b)2(4+b)2(4+3b)2(4+5b)2 > 0: (28)
Thus, the price is the best response of Firm 1.
5.2 The best responses of (the owner of) Firm 2 (or 3)
The situation of Firm 2 and that of Firm 3 are symmetric.
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1. Assume that Firm 1 and 3 are quantity setting firms. Compare the absolute
profit of Firm 2 when it chooses the price as a strategic variable and that when it
chooses the output as a strategic variable. Then, we have
pi1p2  piC2 = 0: (29)
Thus, price and output are indifferent, and both are best responses.
2. Assume that Firm 1 and 3 are price setting firms. Compare the absolute profit of
Firm 2 when it chooses the price as a strategic variable and that when it chooses
the output as a strategic variable. Then, we have
piB2  pi2q2 = 0: (30)
Thus, price and output are indifferent, and both are best responses.
3. Assume that Firm 1 is a price setting firm and Firm 3 is a quantity setting firm.
Compare the absolute profit of Firm 2 when it chooses the price as a strategic
variable and that when it chooses the output as a strategic variable. Then, we
have
pi2p2  pi1q2 = 
6b4(b2 24b 16)(c1  c2)2
(1 b)(4 b)2(4+b)2(4+5b)2 > 0:
Thus, the price is the best response of Firm 2.
4. Assume that Firm 3 is a price setting firm and Firm 1 is a quantity setting firm.
Compare the absolute profit of Firm 2 when it chooses the price as a strategic
variable and that when it chooses the output as a strategic variable. Then, we
have
pi2p2  pi1q2 =
6b4(9b2 8b 16)(c1  c2)2
(1 b)(4 b)2(4+3b)2(4+5b)2 < 0: (31)
Thus, the output is the best response of Firm 2.
From these results about the model of this paper we obtain the following conclu-
sion.
Proposition 2 There are the following four pure strategy sub-game perfect equilibria.
1. All firms choose the outputs as their strategic variables.
2. All firms choose the prices as their strategic variables.
3. Firm 1 and 2 choose the prices as their strategic variables, and Firm 3 chooses
the output as its strategic variable.
4. Firm 1 and 3 choose the prices as their strategic variables, and Firm 2 chooses
the output as its strategic variable.
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6 Conclusion
We have studied the choice of strategic variables under relative profit maximization
in an asymmetric oligopoly with differentiated substitutable goods. We considered a
case with three firms such that two firms have the same cost functions and the other
one firm has a different cost function, and have shown that there are two pure strategy
sub-game perfect equilibria. In duopoly and symmetric oligopoly the equivalence of
price and output strategies under relative profit maximization have been proved. In an
asymmetric oligopoly, however, they are not equivalent.
On the other hand in the last section we have shown that if the owners of firms seek
to maximize the absolute profits of their firms even though (the managers of) firms
maximize their relative profits, there are four sub-game perfect equilibria.
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